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SUMMARY 
Banking deregulation 
Ernst Baltensperger and Jean Dermine 
Deregulation of financial services is well under way in many 
European countries. This has led to fears that economies are 
now more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. The authors 
focus on one aspect of financial deregulation, namely 
liberalization of the banking system. They show that measures 
such as the abolition of reserve requirements increase 
macroeconomic variability under some circumstances but 
reduce it under others. No general macroeconomic case can 
be made for banking regulation or for its liberalization. 
Analysis of microeconomic issues is more fruitful. Asym-
metric information and the risks of contagion in a panic can 
lead to runs against the banking system. To the extent that 
these are socially inefficient, public intervention may be jus-
tified. This presumption is stronger since the risks of bank 
runs have grown recently with the increased maturity mis-
match - the finance of illiquid loans by liquid short-term 
deposits. To meet this danger, the authors recommend regula-
tion of deposit contracts whilst preserving incentives for bank 
monitoring by private parties. Specifically, they propose an 
ex post liability of current and former depositors when banks 
default, thereby offsetting the incentive to withdraw funds at 
the onset of a crisis. Being quick off the mark would no longer 
be sufficient, and sophisticated depositors would press for 
greater disclosure and fuller monitoring of bank activities. 
The authors also recommend that remaining controls on 
deposit interest rates should be scrapped and that supervision 
of international banking should be cooperatively conducted 
by host and parent authorities. 
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1. Introduction 
The deregulation of financial services is a la mode in many countries 
and new financial products or markets are being advertised almost 
every day. In the UK, the 1986 Financial Services Bill provides for the 
integration of underwriting, position-taking and distribution of 
securities within banking conglomerates. Another proposal likely to 
take effect in 1987 will allow Building Societies to compete with Banks 
across a wide range of financial services: personal and corporate loans, 
insurance, unsecured lending, and equity participation. In France, the 
1983 Law on Savings Banks allows for more personal (but not corporate) 
lending. The aim of the 1984 Banking Law is to integrate various types 
of credit institutions. Bank certificates of deposit and commercial paper 
('Billets de Tresorerie') have been authorized and a financial futures 
market (MATIF) has been created. The 'universal type' banking system 
has been much more stable in Germany where the major reforms date 
back to the late 1960s. Certificates of deposit, floating-rate notes and 
zero coupon bonds have recently been authorized. Foreign-owned 
banks incorporated in Germany are permitted to lead foreign DM 
issues, subject to reciprocity. At the European Community level and in 
the GATT, there are pressures to liberalize trade in financial services 
on the grounds that deregulation and integration of financial markets 
will improve the allocation of savings and investment. At the same 
time, fears of financial instability caused by bank failures (such as the 
German Bankhaus Herstatt and the British secondary banking crisis 
in the early 1970s or, more recently, Banco Ambrosiano Holdings, 
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Schroeder-Munchmeyer-Hengst and Johnson Matthey Bankers) have 
forced European governments to adapt their regulatory structure and 
to create formal deposit insurance mechanisms. 
This process raises three major questions. First, does deregulation at 
the national or international level necessarily lead to excessive competi-
tion, overbanking and financial instability? Second, what regulatory 
structure do we need in today's banking system when financial innova-
tions and security-related activities replace traditional on-balance-sheet 
lending? Third, who is going to regulate and supervise international 
banks operating in various countries? Answers to these questions are 
urgently needed as European banking markets are going through an 
unprecedented series of changes. Our objective is to study the costs 
and benefits of banking (de)regulation. As an argument can be made 
that bank regulation affects the ability of monetary policy to control 
the economy, we first analyse briefly the effects of deposit rate controls 
and reserve requirements on the variability of important macro-
economic variables. The main part of the paper, though, is concerned 
with the efficiency of the banking system and, in particular, with deposit 
insurance. It is remarkable to observe how little attention has been paid 
to this last issue in Europe, as compared to the continuing debate in 
the United States. This is probably due to the relatively low number of 
bank failures in Europe in the last 40 years and to the fact that formal 
deposit insurance systems have been introduced only recently. 
Our main policy recommendations are as follows. First, we argue 
that macroeconomic considerations, related to the impact of monetary 
policy, provide no clear-cut argument for or against the kind of regula-
tions currently under consideration: rather these should therefore be 
evaluated on microeconomic efficiency grounds. Second, we observe 
that short-term deposit funding has increased quite rapidly in most 
European countries in the last twenty years. This has created a source 
of potential instability and the need for deposit insurance systems, 
lender-of-last-resort facilities and prudential regulations. We suggest 
regulating the source of instability, the short-term deposit contracts, 
more closely while allowing banks greater freedom in their other 
activities. One of the proposals considered advocates the apportioning 
of losses resulting from bank failures to both current and former 
depositors. With such an ex post penalty system, the incentive to withdraw 
deposits early in a bank run disappears since there would be no way 
to avoid the losses. A major benefit of this proposal is to reduce 
substantially the risk of a systemic run. Third, we find little theoretical 
or empirical support for the regulation of dep>osit rates which still 
prevails in several countries. We recommend the abolition of these 
controls and of the related cartel-type agreements on interest rates. 
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Table 1. Reserve requirements in Europe 
Countries with legal Countries without legal 
reserve requirements reserve requirements 
France Belgium 
Germany Netherlands 
Greece UKa 
Ireland 
Italy 
Spain 
Switzerland 
Source: Bingham (1985). 
Note: (a) Since 1981, all banks have to keep |% of 
liabilities on interest-free account at the central 
bank to generate revenue for the Bank of England. 
Finally, at the international level, we argue that the domestic nature of 
most deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort systems calls for joint 
prudential regulation by the host and parent country authorities. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first part deals with 
macroeconomic considerations. The second part addresses the issues 
of microeconomic efficiency, bank runs and deposit insurance. The 
third and fourth parts are concerned with two issues of specific 
European relevance: the regulation of deposit rates and the supervision 
of international banks. A final section summarizes our conclusions. 
2. Banking deregulation: a macroeconomic view 
There are two main issues in respect of the operation of monetary 
policy. First, it has frequently been argued that a required reserve ratio 
is necessary to constrain the money supply and the price level to a finite 
and determinate level, and to allow the authorities to exercise control 
over these magnitudes. Second, in an economy buffeted by various 
shocks, there may be a relationship between the regulation of bank 
reserves and deposit rates, and the variability of macroeconomic vari-
ables such as the money stock, aggregate demand and the price level. 
2.1. The need for regulation and the demand for base money 
Reserve requirements are the rule in many European countries (see 
Table 1). Is this form of regulation necessary to constrain money and 
credit creation and facilitate the control of inflation by central banks? 
This question has been raised in recent years by a number of authors 
(e.g. Wallace, 1981, 1983; Fama, 1983). We take the view that this is 
not the case, at least given the present technological environment. The 
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question is closely related to the demand for base money in the absence 
of regulation. In any reasonable model of the economy as we know it 
today there is such a demand, and the money stock and the price level 
are determinate and finite, even without regulation. 
Indeed, transaction cost considerations and the fact that bank deposits 
are not entirely risk-free ensure that there would be a positive demand 
for base money, in the form of a demand for currency and/or a demand 
for bank reserves (held for precautionary reasons), even in the absence 
of legal requirements. This is in accordance with the view taken, for 
example, by Fama (1983). All we need is to assume an effective govern-
ment monopoly in base money production,1 and the impossibility of 
private banks producing perfect substitutes for base money. If private 
banks could produce perfect substitutes at zero (or constant and iden-
tical) costs, as suggested, for example, by Wallace (1981, 1983), Bryant 
and Wallace (1984), or Kareken (1984), then the central bank could do 
nothing which could not immediately be undone by private sector banks. 
However, real world uncertainties, information costs, monitoring prob-
lems, and the like, imply that it would be very difficult or impossible 
for private banks to establish a position where their liabilities are accep-
ted as perfect substitutes for base money. Thus, we view the deposit 
contracts supplied by private banks as a differentiated product: a sub-
stitute, but one embodying a somewhat different set of characteristics 
(in particular including as an essential element the provision of cheque 
handling and similar transactions service facilities). 
A demand for base money can occur as a demand either for currency 
or for bank reserves. A demand for currency would exist even in the 
absence of regulations, because for many types of transactions (especially 
'small', everyday transactions) currency has a comparative advantage 
as a medium of exchange. It will remain so even under quite advanced 
financial technologies (Fama, 1983). The relative use of currency and 
bank deposits depends, of course, on the relative rates of return on 
those two assets, that is on the effective rate of return obtained by the 
owners of bank deposits, which will be influenced by deposit rate 
controls and reserve requirements (see, for example, Baltensperger, 
1982b). 
Even with no required reserves, rational (profit maximizing) banks 
would voluntarily hold a certain amount of reserves for precautionary 
1
 That is, we will not discuss the issue of a competitive supply of base monies (currencies) in the 
sense of Klein (1974), Hayek (1978), Vaubel (1984), and others. Rather, our discussion centers 
around the desirability or undesirability of unconstrained competition among banks as producers 
of bank deposits (bank money). Also, we do not consider pure credit (or accounting) systems of 
exchange without a tangible medium of exchange, as they have been envisaged by Black (1970), 
Fama (1980, 1983), Hall (1982, 1983), Niehans (1982), or Greenfield and Yeager (1983). 
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Table 2. Reserve holdings of Swiss and German banks 
1975 1980 1982 1983 1984 
Swiss Banks 
Cash liquidity3 
(% of short-term liabilities) 
Required cash 10.3 
Actual cash 22.3 
Actual/required 2.2 
German Banks 
(millions of DM) 
required reserves 
Actual reserves 
Actual/required 
39,767 
40,301 
1.01 
46,461 
47,122 
1.01 
41,901 
42,232 
1.01 
44,514 
44,941 
1.01 
48,517 
49,123 
1.01 
Sources: Monatsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank, various issues. Das Schweizerische Bank-
wesen, Schweizerische Nationalbank, various volumes. 
Note: (a) Includes currency and deposits with central bank, postal checking system, 
and clearing center of Swiss Regional Banks. 
reasons given the risk of deposit and reserve withdrawals. The level of 
reserve holdings in the absence of a legal requirement should be expec-
ted to depend, in part, on the degree of central bank accommodation 
to which the banking system is accustomed (which is related, in par-
ticular, to the kind of discount policy pursued by the central bank). 
The fact that banking systems in many countries today hold virtually 
no excess reserves (close to zero in Germany, see Table 2) is often taken 
as evidence that in the absence of reserve requirements, and given 
today's degree of money market perfection, banks would hold almost 
no reserves. However, this is misleading, since these examples are 
usually taken from monetary systems where the central bank pursues 
a highly accommodating policy with respect to bank reserves (in the 
short run, at least) and which therefore minimizes the need for banks 
to hold excess reserves. On the other hand, a bank which knows that 
the central bank is not inclined to follow such an accommodating policy 
will have a clear incentive to hold excess reserves. An example of such 
a system is provided by Switzerland, where the central bank adheres 
to a strict policy of base money control and the banking system knows 
that it has to adjust (as a whole) to the amount of base money 
autonomously determined by the central bank at any given point of 
time. As a result, Swiss banks hold considerable amounts of excess 
reserves (see Table 2). It must be pointed out, however, that Swiss banks 
typically increase their cash holdings at months' or quarters' ends, when 
balance sheet data have to be published, so that the data shown overstate 
the amount of excess reserves actually held, on average, during the 
10.9 10.6 10.3 11.0 
18.9 16.1 16.2 15.5 
1.7 1.5 1.6 1.4 
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year. Nevertheless, they are indicative of the importance of central bank 
behaviour for banks' reserve holdings. 
With zero required reserves, the money multiplier should be expected 
to be larger, of course, than with a positive requirement. But it would 
still be determinate, finite, and related to other variables (e.g. interest 
rates) in fundamentally the same way as with a reserve requirement. 
Thus, the money supply would still be controllable, as long as the actual 
reserve ratios held by banks and the nature of their dependence on 
interest rates and other determinants are known or can be modelled. 
2.2. Regulation and macroeconomic variability 
The level of reserve requirements can have an effect, however, on the 
variability of the money stock, the price level, and other aggregates. 
The same is true for deposit rate controls. By influencing the degree 
to which deposit rates can adjust to fluctuations in market conditions, 
controls also affect the variability of monetary aggregates, prices and 
other macroeconomic variables. In recent years, the deregulatory 
measures undertaken or discussed in various countries have been 
reviewed, especially in the United States, from such a macroeconomic 
perspective: Tobin (1983), Lindsay (1977), or Cagan (1979), among 
others, have, for the most part, expressed fears that financial deregula-
tion may introduce new kinds of instability and handicap monetary 
policy. Kareken (1984) finds that deregulation in the US, at least to 
date, has had little impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy. A 
careful theoretical investigation by Santomero and Siegel (1985) argues 
that deregulation has substantial macroeconomic effects which, 
however, cannot unambiguously be said to be detrimental or desirable. 
The present discussion, which is based on Baltensperger (1982a) and 
in the spirit of Poole (1970), comes to a similar conclusion. Regulation 
and deregulation affect the behaviour of the macroeconomy and its 
response to various kinds of real and financial disturbances - a fact 
which should be noted when making and evaluating monetary policy. 
However, it is difficult, and probably not advisable, to decide on the 
desirability or undesirability of particular regulations on the basis of 
macroeconomic stability considerations. An unregulated system has a 
flexibility and elasticity that may be undesirable in some situations, but 
advantageous in others. 
Reserve requirements, in particular, have frequently been judged 
from the point of view of monetary and economic stability. The focus 
has typically been on money stock control. Relatively high reserve 
requirements have usually been seen as beneficial on this account, a 
view best exemplified by the well-known proposal of 100% reserves 
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(e.g. Fisher, 1935; Friedman, 1959). However, the superiority of a high 
reserve requirement, in terms of its effects on economic stability, is not 
as easy to demonstrate as is often thought, once the focus is shifted 
from short-run money stock stability to the stability of aggregate demand 
and the price level as the ultimate objectives. It should be stressed that 
such a shift in emphasis is not a call for disregarding the importance 
of monetary stability. However, arguing for monetary stability in the 
sense of keeping the money supply on track along a given medium to 
long-term expansion path via appropriate changes in the monetary base 
is not the same as arguing that the money stock variability caused by 
some given external disturbances should be minimized via appropriate 
changes in monetary institutions and regulations. This is because the 
underlying variability may then simply show up somewhere else: if we 
are concerned about the effects of external disturbances on the 
economy, we should not just look at their effects on the money stock. 
A simple macroeconomic model suitable for the analysis of the impact 
of regulation on the effects of different types of shocks, based on 
Baltensperger (1982a), is given in the Appendix. We conclude that the 
effects of regulatory changes on macroeconomic variability depend on 
the origin of the underlying disturbance and that it is difficult to make 
a convincing case for (or against) these regulations on such grounds. 
Our conclusion thus is that regulatory decisions should be based not 
on macroeconomic stability considerations of the kind reviewed here 
but rather on microeconomic efficiency grounds. 
2.3. Bank failures and financial innovations as a constraint on monetary policy 
The fear that restrictive monetary policies could lead to bank failures 
and financial instability, and that this can create a constraint on 'admiss-
ible' monetary policies, is sometimes used as an argument in favour of 
regulations aimed at reducing or eliminating the danger of bank failures 
(e.g. the view of deposit rate ceilings as a 'compensation' helping banks 
to survive these dangers). However, these arguments are not convincing. 
If monetary policy is more or less neutral in its long-run effects on the 
real economy, as might be expected to a first approximation, then it is 
difficult to see why variations in the money supply could create serious 
permanent problems for basically sound banks. With flexible wages and 
commodity prices, monetary policy would have no real effects in the 
short run. With sluggish, slowly adjusting wages and commodity prices, 
there would be some real effects, but of a temporary nature only. While 
this could, indeed, lead to liquidity shortages, it would force bankers 
to incorporate this risk into their management strategies through 
appropriate liquidity and capital ratios, and to adjust the maturity 
structure of their assets and liabilities (the extent to which this is 
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necessary depends on the degree of accommodating behaviour which 
can be expected from the central bank). 
Of course, bank failures are bound to occur and it is the responsibility 
of the monetary authorities to guarantee the stability of the financial 
system through creating an appropriate legal and institutional 
framework. In particular, they have the duty of guaranteeing that bank 
failures do not lead to a systemic bank run or to undesired variations 
(shrinkages) of the money stock (the lender-of-last-resort function). In 
such a framework, there would be no constraint on the active use of 
monetary policy. This issue should not be confused with the (real) 
problems which may arise from changes in the regulatory framework, 
and which may then arise particularly severely when a restrictive 
monetary policy is pursued at the same time. Abolishing or relaxing a 
regulation which has previously served to protect the survival of certain 
groups of banks which would not have survived otherwise (in the same 
form) will in all likelihood, lead to difficulties for these banks. While 
this may be exacerbated by a tight monetary policy, it is not really 
caused by the latter. 
A related, and frequently voiced, concern is that financial innovation 
and deregulation lead to more financial instability, as market par-
ticipants and the authorities now face more unexpected developments 
and shifts ('disturbances') in financial markets (e.g. Tobin, 1983). But 
is it really true that deregulation can be said to lead to more financial 
instability? Admittedly, in a transitional stage this may be so, as changes 
in regulation (in both directions) involve a certain amount of uncertainty 
about their effect on market participants and their responses. In the 
long run, however, it is not clear why this should be the case. Further-
more, as pointed out by Kane (1981), to the extent that financial 
innovation is itself the result of existing regulations, and as more 
stringent and numerous regulations create an incentive for finding 
innovative ways around these regulations, deregulation may actually 
lead to a decline in financial innovation and, in this sense, increase the 
stability of financial markets. In this connection, it is interesting to note 
that in explaining the comparatively low degree of innovative activity 
apparently taking place in Germany and in Switzerland, their central 
bankers have pointed to the comparatively low levels of financial regula-
tion (prudential controls excluded). 
3. Banking deregulation and financial stability: 
a microeconomic view 
In this part, we analyse first the potential market failures calling for 
bank regulation. We start with a brief review of the role of banks, 
followed by a discussion of the potential sources of instability and of 
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the need for public intervention. The current system of banking regula-
tion is analysed and we discuss three proposals to improve the current 
regulatory framework. 
3.1. The role of banks and the source of market failure 
A bank or a financial intermediary is a firm whose assets include primary 
financial claims issued by borrowers such as individuals, governments, 
firms (or other financial intermediaries) and whose liabilities are sold 
as secondary claims to capital surplus units in various forms such as 
demand deposits, savings deposits, term deposits, subordinated debt 
(loan capital) or equity shares. (To keep pace with recent financial 
innovations, we include in our definition all the insurance-related 
activities such as letter of credit, and note-issuance facilities - the 
so-called 'off-balance-sheet' items). We therefore include commercial 
banks (public or private), savings banks, finance and leasing companies 
and mutual funds. The first step in an analysis of bank regulation is to 
understand the nature of the services provided by banks and the sources 
of market failure calling for public intervention. Although the services 
provided by banks are interrelated, it is convenient to distinguish three 
categories of increasing complexity: portfolio management, payment 
(transmission) services, and monitoring and risk-sharing mechanisms. 
3.1.1. Portfolio management. The first service offered by banks is a 'portfolio 
management' service. Financial intermediaries help savers to acquire 
at low cost a diversified portfolio of financial liabilities issued by capital-
deficit units. The purest example is the mutual fund which allows the 
holder of its shares to have access to a diversified portfolio of claims. 
Mutual funds' shares are valued at market prices every day and, in 
essence, this financial intermediary is a channel between deficit and 
surplus units which reduces transaction costs. 
3.1.2. Payment mechanism. The second role of banks in the economy is to 
manage the payment system, that is, to facilitate and keep track of 
transfers of wealth among individuals. This is the bookkeeping activity 
of banks realized by debiting and crediting accounts. By keeping a 
record of the amount of funds invested by each party in the pooled 
portfolio, the bank is able to organize the exchange of claims among 
individuals that can be initiated by cheques, money orders or, with the 
coming new technology, by home banking or EFTPOS (electronic funds 
transfers and point-of-sale terminal) facilities. 
If a bank were to offer only these two services - the issue of shares 
to finance a diversified pool of assets and the management of payment 
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services - its shares would be marked at market every day and sharehol-
ders would earn the market rate of return, adjusted for risk, less a fee 
retained by the intermediary for managing the investment pool and 
the payment mechanism.2 The view presented so far is, in short, that 
espoused by the so-called new school, often referred to as the Fama-
Black-Hall (FBH) school. (Fama, 1980; Black, 1970; Hall, 1982 and 
discussed in McCallum, 1985). Their primary conclusion is that banking 
activities, defined as investment services and payment mechanisms, do 
not require any particular regulation because there is nothing special 
to banking. However, this new school takes too simple a view of the 
economic function of banks by ignoring a third important series of 
services, the risk sharing (insurance) and monitoring facilities. These 
services create the need for public intervention. 
3.1.3. Risk-sharing and monitoring services. A n essent ial func t ion of banks 
is to transform the risk faced by the parties or, to put it in modern 
terminology, to supply risk-sharing contracts. The risk-sharing service 
is an integral part of the portfolio and payment services and is presented 
here as an additional service for convenience only. There are many 
such risk-sharing facilities. The first one is that banks not only provide 
a diversified pool of assets, but also organize efficiently the distribution 
of the risky income earned on the asset pool. The debt holders (the 
depositors) usually receive a fixed payment (the interest) while the 
shareholders of the banks assume the risk in receiving the residual 
income. Other risk-sharing or insurance activities will include liquidity 
insurance (options for debt holders to withdraw the funds quickly at 
face value), interest rate insurance (floating-rate lending with ceilings 
on interest rates) and, in principle, any type of risk such as income 
variability. 
According to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a standard insurance 
market will not emerge because the information about liquidity needs 
is private so that the insurer could not distinguish the cash-constrained 
consumers from the others. However, a liquid deposit contract is a 
perfect instrument because cash-constrained consumers can withdraw 
their deposits early while the other consumers have an incentive to keep 
their deposits in the bank to benefit from a higher return:3 banks act 
as insurance companies. Although difficult to measure, the risk-sharing 
2
 Although tax considerations such as VAT and personal income tax will induce banks to offer a 
lower (taxable) interest rate in exchange of free services. With a 20% VAT and a 50% tax rate 
on interest income, the savings can represent as much as 70% of the value of the services. 
3
 Haubrich (1985) and Jacklin (1984) also use a two-period deposit contract to provide an efficient 
risk-sharing mechanism in a world with imperfect information. 
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function is of great value because it permits the financing of risky 
projects with an appropriate distribution of returns among individuals. 
In addition to risk-sharing services, banks perform a very useful 
function in reducing the costs of screening and monitoring borrowers. 
In many cases, private information held by borrowers result in financial 
contracting problems and in costly monitoring. Diamond (1984, 1986) 
has shown why banks can reduce these costs. Instead of monitoring 
borrowers themselves, depositors delegate this activity to a financial 
intermediary. Depositors will of course need to evaluate the financial 
intermediary itself, but by diversifying its loan portfolio across many 
borrowers, the intermediary reduces substantially the aggregate risk so 
that the cost of monitoring by depositors is substantially reduced.4 A 
major result is that optimal financial contracting takes the form of loans 
and deposits and that it results in financial intermediaries holding an 
illiquid loan portfolio: the potential for market failure lies in these 
risk-sharing and monitoring functions. Two independent explanations 
have been advanced: the public good character of information gathering 
and monitoring, and the liquidity of par value deposits which can create 
a bank run. 
The evaluation of the solvency of a bank and the monitoring of its 
activities is a costly activity which has the nature of a public good. As 
such, it may be supplied more efficiently by the public sector rather 
than by the private sector (rating agencies). And if large numbers of 
small scale depositors find it costly to undertake the fixed cost of 
processing and understanding bank ratings, however supplied, it may 
be more efficient for the government to remove this requirement by 
providing deposit insurance. Monitoring would then be conducted by 
the public sector and regulation would be the vehicle for making those 
assessments bite. It must be stressed that these arguments are not specific 
to the banking industry, though that may be the industry in which the 
interaction of small scale and the fixed cost of understanding the ratings 
is highest. 
The second source of failure is specific to banking. The par value 
and liquid deposit features of the deposit contract result in incentives 
to withdraw deposits and run at the onset of problems. Because of 
asymmetric information, banks are unable to distinguish liquidity-
driven withdrawals and prudential ones. There is a market failure 
because a bank run is an inefficient way of solving bank defaults. The 
reason is that bank assets include loans which cannot be realized easily 
! I 
4
 Diversification is so complete in Diamond's model that (unsystematic) risk disappears completely, 
so that the monitoring costs of depositors go to zero. Imperfect diversification, fraud or moral 
hazard would, in the real world, necessitate monitoring of banks by depositors (Hellwig, 1985). 
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in a short time. In the case of a bank run, these illiquid assets have to 
be realized with heavy transaction costs, or else profitable production 
has to be interrupted if the loans are called in. Therefore, a bank run 
will reduce the efficiency of the risk-sharing contract (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983). 
An alternative explanation of market failure stresses the 'contagious' 
nature of a run. Because of imperfect information on the solvency of 
other banks, a bank failure can trigger a run on other, solvent banks. 
As Bagehot put it long ago: 'The peculiar essence of our banking system 
is an unprecedented trust between man and man. And when that trust 
is much weakened by hidden causes, a small accident can greatly hurt 
it' (Bagehot, 1873). A large bank run can happen when one bank fails, 
because people will follow the crowd assuming that the value of banks' 
assets are highly correlated with one another. Whatever the source of 
the contagious run (panic or a signalling effect), it creates an externality 
because the failure of solvent banks will impair customer relationships 
and raise the future cost of credit (Bernanke., 1983). Appropriate 
disclosure of information should reduce the risk of a large run on 
solvent banks,5 but it remains likely that some depositors will still 
withdraw: it only takes a few seconds for the careful treasurer of a firm 
to transfer funds. The financing of illiquid assets with volatile short-term 
deposits always creates the possibility of a costly and inefficient bank run. 
No one should dare to guess the likelihood of a bank run in Europe, 
but it is possible that some accidents and failures may occur as the 
financial markets adapt to deregulation, financial and technological 
innovations and to the volatile economic environment. In particular, 
the developments of 'off-balance-sheet' instruments (such as options, 
futures, swaps and loan commitments) raise some concern while the 
accounting, risk management and supervisory systems are still in their 
infancy (BIS, 1986). These innovations further reduce the transparency 
of balance sheets, with the result that market participants will find it 
harder to evaluate the solvency of banks. Another worrying develop-
ment is that, as part of their liability management strategy, banks have 
relied increasingly on (non-insured) money market funding. In 
5
 There is a strong difference between the American view which favours disclosure of non-
performing loans, international exposure and maturity mismatch and the European practice of 
low disclosure and hidden reserves (an EEC accounting proposal ailows hidden reserves up to 
5% of risky assets). The argument for the latter view is that low disclosure reduces the probability 
of a run, because events which would be perceived as bad by the public will go unnoticed while, 
if there is a run when banks are solvent, the regulators can release information to maintain 
stability. We doubt that the information provided by the regulators at a time of a run will be 
trusted by the public. The recent case of the Continental Bank in Canada shows that the Bank 
of Canada could not stop the run and that Continental Bank had to open its books to the 
accountants of other banks to prove its solvency and finally stop the run. 
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Table 3. Banking systems in Europe 
Total assets 
of banks Capital asset ratio Foreign liabilities 
(96 of GDP) (96) (96 of assets) 
1965 1975 1985 1965 1975 1985 1965 1975 1985 
Belgium 33 68 162 4.6 2.7 2.5 27 51 74 
France 
Germany 
UK 
Italy 
Switzerland 
30 
74 
44 
62 
156 
59 
100 
100 
100 
156 
82 
132 
168 
90 
240 
3.8 
— 
— 
2.0 
5.8 
2.3 
4.0 
— 
2.6 
5.5 
2.0 
5.5 
4.2 
2.9 
4.7 
— 
3 
24 
7 
20 
22 
6 
50 
9 
23 
34 
8 
71 
16 
24 
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IMF) and Revell (1980). 
Table 3 we show the size of several national banking systems relative 
to GNP, the capital asset ratio and foreign liabilities as a percentage of 
total assets. One observes, in all countries, an increase in banking activity 
(relative to GNP) and in the share of foreign liabilities in total funding. 
To a very large extent, these are interbank deposits that national 
monetary authorities will find difficult to control in times of crisis. 
Belgium and the UK are especially vulnerable with more than 70% of 
liabilities in the ownership of foreigners. 
The existence of a large share of money market deposits in total 
funding does not imply a risk of a liquidity crisis if these deposits are 
used to finance liquid assets. Today, only France, the Netherlands, 
Germany and Switzerland have formal liquidity ratio rules. Since most 
of these regulations take a 'going concern' approach and assume that 
some fraction of the liquid deposits are permanent one ends up with 
a system which is de facto less stringent than a 100% liquid assets 
requirement. In the UK for instance, the volume of foreign currency 
deposits of less than 3-month maturity that were not covered by assets 
of less than 3-month maturity represented 13.8% of total foreign cur-
rency deposits at the end of 1985. In the case of Belgium and France, 
this number was 18% and 14% respectively6. If one looks at the mis-
matching of sterling deposits in the UK, the same measure rises to 41 %. 
The Dutch regulation, however, is more stringent as there is a 100% 
liquid assets requirement on less than one month-maturity interbank 
deposits. A large supply of interbank deposits which are not backed by 
liquid assets obviously creates a potential risk of a liquidity crisis. The 
various ways to reduce the risk of bank runs are discussed in the 
following sections. 
6
 Sources: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Rapport Annuel Commission Bancaire (Brussels), 
Rapport Commission Bancaire (Paris). 
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3.2. Current forms of public intervention 
Two types of public intervention are used to reduce the risk of bank 
failures and runs: deposit insurance and prudential regulation. By 
making deposits virtually risk free, a deposit insurance system reduces 
the risk of a run and allows the banks to follow an appropriate liquidation 
policy which is not constrained by withdrawals. Two forms of deposit 
insurance must be distinguished, discretionary and contractual. 
3.2.1. Discretionary intervention. We include in this category all interven-
tions that are at the discretion of a government: lender-of-last-resort 
(eventually at a subsidized rate), public guarantee, or nationalization. 
The main characteristic of a discretionary intervention is that it is not 
granted 'for sure', so that depositors may still withdraw in times of 
crisis. This uncertainty creates obvious incentives for depositors to 
monitor the riskiness of the financial intermediaries to whom they are 
lending. Until the recent creation of deposit insurance mechanisms, 
this was the only form of public intervention in Europe. However, there 
was a common understanding that public intervention was almost cer-
tain, especially for the larger banks. The case of Johnson Matthey 
Bankers shows that even smaller banks will be protected. In a discretion-
ary intervention system, the costs of bailing out are shared by the central 
bank (the tax payers) and by the private banks. In the recent case of 
Johnson Matthey Bankers, the total cost of £200 million was shared by 
the parent (76%), the clearing banks (12%) and the Bank of England 
(12%). 
3.2.2. Contractual Intervention. Examples include the deposit insurance or 
protection fund systems created recently in Europe (see Table 4). 
Usually these schemes are funded with premiums proportional to 
deposits: only in the Netherlands and France are the systems unfunded. 
Funded insurance was adopted in Belgium after 1984 when a bank 
failure (Banque Copine) produced adverse effects on banks' profitability 
when losses were apportioned among them. The extent of the coverage 
varies substantially across countries and it must be pointed out that the 
eligibility criterion for deposit insurance is the size of the deposit rather 
than the income or wealth of the deposit holder. 
As is well known, a flat insurance premium system creates an obvious 
moral hazard problem. Banks may increase the riskiness of their 
activities as the insured depositors have very few incentives to monitor 
their bank. Various forms of risk will include a low equity ratio, riskier 
lending policies, foreign exchange risk and maturity mismatching. 
Because of moral hazard, the contractual deposit insurance system and 
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Table 4. Deposit insurance systems in Europe 
System 
Belgium 
Official government system (1985) 
France 
Banking industry (1979) 
Germany 
Banking industry (1977) 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Banking industry (1972) 
United Kingdom 
Official government (1979) 
Switzerland 
Coverage 
Fully up to ceiling 
(BF 500,000) 
Fully up to ceiling 
(FF 250,000) 
Up to 30% of bank equity 
Under discussion 
Fully up to ceiling 
(D.F1. 135,000) 
75% of deposits up to 
ceiling £10,000 
none 
Financing 
Funded 
Unfunded 
Funded 
— 
Unfunded 
Funded 
— 
Sources: Dale, (1984) and national sources. 
Note: In France, losses are apportioned among the banks. There is a ceiling on the 
financial commitment of each bank which, up to now, has never been reached. 
discretionary interventions of the Central Banks have to be comple-
mented by prudential regulations, including capital and liquidity ratios, 
and constraints on asset concentration, foreign exchange, or maturity 
mismatching. Equity is particularly important in this respect. Not only 
does it reduce the risk of bankruptcy, but it also reduces the incentives 
for risk taking by banks. Indeed, the larger the equity, the larger are 
the losses of shareholders in case of bankruptcy. The linkage between 
deposit insurance, moral hazard, and prudential regulation has been 
discussed by several authors (e.g. Kareken and Wallace, 1978), always 
in a pure financial model where the objective is profit or market value 
maximization. Managerial incentives for safety will reduce the strength 
of the moral hazard argument, but it should not be disregarded as one 
needs only a few risky banks to destabilize the system, and new financial 
instruments - options and futures - provide large gambling oppor-
tunities. 
The motivation for the recent creation of deposit insurance systems 
in Europe is the traditional one of protecting 'small' depositors and 
reducing the incentive for a bank run. However, this last objective is 
unlikely to be met as only 'small' deposits are insured. In Belgium, for 
instance, less than 15% of the banks' total liabilities are insured. In the 
UK, eligible deposits are only insured up to 75% of their value. For 
these reasons, the deposit insurance mechanisms have been augmented 
by lender-of-last-resort facilities. Therefore, the level of monitoring by 
private parties is likely to be small, a situation which is even reinforced 
by the low level of disclosure. Monitoring therefore rests esssentially 
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on the shoulders of bank supervisors.7 The major shortcomings of the 
current system are, in our view, twofold: too few private incentives to 
monitor banks and the existence of a serious moral hazard problem. 
Three proposals to improve the current regulatory system are success-
ively analysed. 
3.3. Alternative banking structures: proposals 
The three proposals share the common characteristic of deregulating 
banking markets and activities, with the exception of the short-term 
deposit contract. They also attempt to shift the costs of bank failure to 
the private sector so as to increase the incentives for monitoring. The 
first proposal requires some form of deposit insurance for all short-term 
deposits. In the second proposal, the losses incurred in the case of a 
bank failure are apportioned among current and former depositors 
through an ex post penalty system. Finally, the third proposal, based on 
the principle of 'corporate separateness', attempts to reduce the risks 
assumed by short-term depositors. 
3.3.1. Proposal one: deposit insurance. Money market; funding a n d liability 
management are permitted in the first proposal, but contractual deposit 
insurance for all liquid deposits must be enforced. Liquid deposit 
contracts with 100% fairly priced insurance permits the decomposition 
of the conventional deposit contract into two components: a risk-free 
asset (the insured deposit) and a risky component (a share of the deposit 
insurance company, technically a contingent liability on the bank asset). 
Once the risky component is separated from the risk-free component, 
the incentive for depositors to run disappears completely and the 
banking system becomes fully stable. Depositors have access to (risk-free) 
liquid deposits at their bank and to risky assets at the insurance com-
panies. The main benefit of the proposal is that the banking system can 
be completely free of public regulation since the risk of a bank run has 
been eradicated. 
The previous discussion should make clear why a private system is, 
in principle, preferable to a public one. The private solution allows 
economic units to select an optimal portfolio of assets made up of 
risk-free deposits and of the risky shares issued by the insurance com-
panies. Transaction costs apart, the allocation of risks under the deposit 
insurance scheme is identical to the allocation obtained with risky 
deposits, except that the splitting up of the contract reduces the incentive 
7
 Regulators must not only monitor banks but also take the decision to close insolvent banks in 
time as, in principle, insured depositors have no reason to withdraw their funds. 
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to run. As insurance companies will bear the risk of bank failures the 
system will work only if governments allow companies to fail; otherwise 
we would still have the moral hazard problem, but it would now apply 
to insurance companies. However, the risk of a run will still remain if 
insurance companies go bankrupt, so that residual insurance must be 
provided to depositors through lender-of-last-resort interventions. 
Losses caused by individual bank failures would be borne by the private 
insurance system and, in the case of a major banking collapse, the 
lender of last resort would take over. Eventually, the deposit insurance 
can be organized by the banks themselves. The banking industry would 
act as a 'banking club' which would regulate its members in much the 
same way as the club concept applies to the medical profession or the 
Stock Exchange (Goodhart, 1985b). 
The difficulties of pricing insurance premiums and the volume of 
liquid deposits have been raised as important practical objections to the 
above proposal. However, insurance companies appear to price very 
complex contracts (such as shipping in the Middle East) and there exist 
private insurance contracts for corporate debt.8 As in any private finan-
cial contract, there would be covenants to limit the risk taken by the 
banks; these covenants would be the free market equivalent of current 
public regulation. In particular, insurance companies will force banks 
to increase their equity, thereby increasing the exposure of shareholders 
and reducing the incentive to take over-risky positions. To encourage 
this development the present corporate tax system, which encourages 
debt relative to equity by allowing the deductibility of nominal interest 
payments, will have to be altered, (Dermine, 1985). Moreover, since 
depositors implicitly accept holding a risk-free asset and a risky com-
ponent, it is not clear why they would not be willing to hold a risk-free 
insured deposit and a share of the insurance company. If, indeed, there 
is a shortage of insurance equity, it would be a signal that depositors 
care only for risk-free deposits and that banks should reduce risk. If a 
public insurance scheme is to be preferred, one would still favour a 
flexible premium system to put prudential pressures on banks, to reduce 
moral hazard and to allow for more deregulation. In this respect, it 
must be emphasized that the rules guiding the pricing of insurance will 
be very similar to those governing capital adequacy, which relate capital 
to asset structure, and are currently in use in several European countries. 
Properly priced insurance premiums should cover not only the costs 
of bank failure but also the costs incurred by lender-of-last-resort 
interventions. 
1 I 
8
 'Prudential forms unit to guarantee other firms' debt', Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 1986. 
Aetna takes on swap insurance', Euromoney, May 1986. 
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A final question concerns the extent of the coverage. If the purpose 
of the deposit insurance is to reduce bank runs, one would have to 
insure all short-term deposits, including interbank assets. The minimum 
maturity would be related to the time necessary for public authorities 
to restore confidence (Merrick and Saunders, 1985). Deposit insurance 
would need to be compulsory to avoid the classical free-rider problem. 
Individually, depositors have few incentives to buy deposit insurance 
as they can hope to run and avoid the costs of a liquidity crisis. However, 
if the objective is only to protect the 'small and unsophisticated' 
depositor, then it would seem logical to use an income or wealth criterion 
to provide insurance rather than the current 'deposit size' system. This 
would solve the well known problem of brokered deposits whereby very 
large sums of money are divided by brokers into small insured bank 
deposits. 
Flexible premium deposit insurance will reduce moral hazard and 
the probability of a bank run. However, since the risk of default by 
private insurance agencies will require additional public protection and, 
therefore, a supervision of insurance companies, we now consider a 
completely different proposal. 
3.3.2. Proposal two: ex post penalty. The second proposal attempts to reduce 
the risk of a systemic run while increasing the incentives for bank 
monitoring by depositors. In the case of a bank failure, an ex post penalty 
is imposed on all current and former depositors.9 The incentive to run 
would be reduced since there would be no way to avoid the losses 
accompanying a bank failure. The proposed system would work as 
follows. Any bank experiencing a liquidity crisis would have automatic 
access to a lender of last resort (public or private) who, from that 
moment on, would monitor the activities of the bank in the best interest 
of the depositors. In many cases, it will be in the interest of the bank's 
shareholders (or managers) themselves to call for this intervention when 
they are convinced that their bank is solvent and that they should not 
sell illiquid assets with heavy transaction costs. In other cases where the 
bank is insolvent, the managers may prefer to incur these costs to have 
time to gamble in the hope of recouping the losses. The intervention 
of a supervisor would then be necessary. To announce publicly the 
liquidity crisis, the bank would be closed for a day, a bank holiday. If 
in the future, the bank proves to be insolvent, the losses will be borne 
by shareholders and by all current and former depositors (the ex post 
penalty system). Depositors at risk would need to monitor the bank or 
9
 This proposal was suggested to us by Don Mathieson of the International Monetary Fund. It is 
implicit in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 
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hire an agent (a rating firm) and the incentive to run will be reduced 
since there is no way to avoid the losses. 
To work properly, the system requires instruments to enforce the 
penalty on former depositors and a definition of the timing of failure. 
Some measure of abnormal deposit outflows could be used to define 
the exact timing. The only depositors not liable for losses would be 
those who have withdrawn their funds before the failure date. As to 
enforcement, one would need the means to reach non-residents. 
When the bank reopens after the holiday, it may be necessary to increase 
equity and, to attract new deposits, it will be made clear that they will 
not be held responsible for the previous losses incurred before the 
holiday. If the market does not trust the bank it will be necessary to 
impose directly a penalty on shareholders and former depositors to 
reinforce the solvency and credibility of the 'new' bank. After a few 
years, the supervision by the lender of last resort and the special status 
will be ended. Technical problems include the timing of failure, the 
enforcement of the ex post penalty and the definition of losses having 
occurred before the bank holiday. These are not easy problems to solve 
but they do not appear more complex than the pricing of flexible 
risk-related insurance premiums. The major difference between the ex 
post penalty and deposit insurance is that, in the first case, losses 
are borne by depositors while, in the second case, they are shifted to 
the deposit insurance agencies and, in the case of deposit insurance 
failure, to the public lender of last resort. The complete privatization 
of costs in the ex post penalty system is a clear advantage. 
3.3.3. Proposal three: corporate separateness. T h e thi rd proposal is more ad 
hoc and pragmatic in the sense that one form of regulation, corporate 
separateness, is assumed to improve the existing regulatory framework. 
Basically, banks will be forced to issue only risk-free liquid deposits, 
that is first-order claims fully collateralized by short-term and market-
able assets marked to market every day. Alternatively, a limited liability 
company within a bank conglomerate should be created to finance 
marketable assets with short-term deposits. Corporate separateness has 
been suggested recently by Kareken (1986) and Chase (1985). 
Depositors who hold risk-free deposits have no reason to run and the 
monitoring pressure is put on the second-order depositors who bear 
the risk, so that banks can be deregulated. Should short-term interbank 
deposits be included in the senior claims category? The answer is positive 
if the only objective is financial stability, but the policy alters the 
character of financial markets by forbidding the financing of illiquid 
loans with short-term deposits (Diamond and Dybvig, 1986) and risk 
sharing between short-term and longer-term deposits. This would 
Banking deregulation 83 
increase the cost of intermediation and could have serious consequences 
for the structure of financial markets. Weaker forms of corporate 
separateness would require first-order claims for all liquid deposits to 
be partly collateralized by liquid assets. Constraints on intermediation 
would be reduced but liquid deposits would retain some risk. 
A distinct argument in favour of corporate separateness is that the 
regulation of banks is difficult to achieve since the efficiency of world 
financial markets allows the banks to change their positions very rapidly 
and substantially. Corporate separateness is then perceived as the best 
way to avoid the moral hazard problem inherent in deposit insurance 
and lender-of-last-resort interventions. In this respect, one can extend 
the asymmetric information argument of Diamond (1984). Depositors 
or deposit insurance agencies will prefer to forbid or separate the 
activities of banks that cannot be monitored or diversified in a satisfac-
tory way. With private deposit insurance or ex post penalty systems, it 
is likely that corporate separateness will emerge as a natural way to 
limit the exposure of depositors or of the insurance agencies. 
We observe that the three proposals correctly attempt to shift the 
emphasis of regulations from bank activities to the deposit contract 
itself, the source of market failure. For us, a flexible insurance premium 
or an ex post penalty system would greatly improve on the current 
situation. We suggest that the legal aspects of an ex post penalty system 
should be analysed more fully and that corporate separateness should 
be considered as a form of regulation to limit moral hazard. 
4. The regulation of deposit rates 
For years a common characteristic of banking regulation in many 
European countries has been the control of interest rates on demand, 
savings or time deposits. A recent survey by the OECD (see Table 5) 
shows that some form of regulation or cartel-like agreement is still the 
rule in many European countries today. The recent history of higher 
inflation and interest rates has diminished the strength of these controls, 
but to date deregulation has been largely concerned with the pricing 
of large deposits. Many European countries are still far from the 
deregulated environment of the US where interest rates on savings and 
time deposits have been totally free (Calem, 1985). For instance, the 
regulation of interest rates on term deposits has been tightened in 
France since 1981, and in Belgium a new regukition of interest rates 
on savings deposits was implemented in 1985. 
The existence of controls or cartel-like agreements on interest rates 
in the European Economic Community may seem to be in sharp contra-
diction with articles 85 and 96 of the Treaty of Rome on competition, 
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Table 5. Deposit rate regulation in Europe 
Market rate paid Market rate paid 
on demand deposits on savings deposits 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yesa 
Yesb 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes" 
No 
Yesa 
Yes 
Sources: Bingham, (1985) and national sources. 
Notes: (a) 'Concerted' pricing; (b) At the end of 1984, 31% of A/, was 
interest-bearing sight deposits, (Goodhart, 1985a). 
but they have been tolerated as 'monetary policy instruments' of Mem-
ber States. However, it seems that the position of the Commission is 
changing with a greater emphasis on competition in deposit pricing. 
Dassesse and Isaacs (1985) explain, in a recent study on EEC banking 
law, that before 1981 the view of the Commission was that interbank 
agreements on interest rates would meet the competition articles if the 
agreement was made upon the initiative and with the approval of the 
national monetary authorities: banking agreements would then be con-
sidered as 'monetary policy instruments' of Member States. However, 
they point out that the position of the Commission has recently changed 
in that 'the Commission is now of the opinion that interest rates should 
not be governed by inter-bank agreements, even if they are approved, 
authorized or promoted by the national authorities responsible for 
economic, financial or monetary matters. Interest rates should either 
be established individually by banks freely competing between them, 
or be regulated directly by the domestic supervisory authorities, if they 
choose to do so.' 
The objective of this section will be to offer a critical analysis of the 
traditional arguments in favour of the regulation of deposit rates. These 
relate respectively to prudential, macroeconomic and welfare considera-
tions; the merits of a bankers 'gentleman's agreement' in pricing will 
also be addressed. The three major conclusions are as follows. First, 
the traditional arguments in favour of deposit rate regulation do not 
stand up to theoretical and empirical analysis. Deposit rates should be 
deregulated and financial stability can be obtained through higher 
capital adequacy standards. Second, the practice of concerted pricing 
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should be abolished and anti-dumping regulations may be enacted to 
limit predatory pricing. Third, a supply of index-linked loans could 
improve welfare in countries which have experienced a permanent 
(even if mild) inflation in the past twenty years. 
On prudential grounds, it is believed that deregulated banks would 
bid aggressively for funds and that the higher cost of funds would lead 
them to take on excessive risks. The regulation of deposit rates is seen 
as the optimal tool to obtain a proper balance between competition and 
financial stability. A second argument meets a macroeconomic objective. 
It is hoped that a reduced cost of funds will be passed on to the borrowers 
through lower loan rates; this will presumably increase investment and 
growth in the economy. A third argument is that the regulation of 
interest rates will stabilize the cost of bank funds, enabling financial 
intermediaries to lend on a fixed-rate basis. This would be welfare 
improving for risk-averse borrowers. Finally, a case is made in some 
countries for gentleman's agreements between banks to prevent des-
tabilizing pricing policies10. Before we analyse the validity of these 
prudential, macroeconomic and welfare arguments, we consider the 
effectiveness of these controls. Do they effectively reduce the cost of 
funds or are they evaded fully or in part by a provision of free services 
and other forms of non-price competition? Empirical evidence on this 
matter is scarce in Europe but it points to some effectiveness of controls 
on deposit rates. 
4.1. The effectiveness of deposit rate regulation 
Deposit rate regulation is one form of price control which, in a highly 
competitive market, could be evaded by non-price competition means 
such as opening branches, advertising or bundling services (free 
chequing accounts for those with large deposits). The financial inter-
mediary would not earn any rent from such price controls in this stylized 
competitive economy. However, if price controls are only partly evaded 
- the case of imperfect competition - some rents will accrue to the 
intermediaries. Empirical studies in the US report that banks return to 
depositors between one and two-thirds of the yield from investing 
deposit funds (Startz, 1983). 
10
 We will not address a fifth type of argument in favour of deposit rate regulation which is 
popular in Belgium today. As the income from savings deposits is tax-free (up to 50,000 Belgian 
francs), the volume of these deposits has increased substantially with an adverse effect on tax 
revenues (at the end of 1983, they represent 41.3% of savings, time deposits and bonds issued 
by banks). Recent regulations (Commission Bancaire, 1985) limit, the interest rate on savings 
deposits to restrain their volume (this rate is set at 4.65%, as compared to a Treasury Bill rate 
of 7.3% in August 1986). 
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Table 6. Interest rate margins in several European countries (% p.a.) 
Belgium 
Margin on demand deposits 
1965 5.0 
1975 11.0 
1985 8.7 
Average margin 
1980-85 11.2 
Margin on savings deposits 
1965 1.5 
1975 4.0 
1985 3.0 
Average margin 
1980-85 5.6 
France 
3.4 
8.0 
9.0 
11.7 
1.4 
1.0 
3.0 
4.3 
Germany 
3.9 
5.2 
4.8 
6.5 
0.2 
0.0 
0.8 
2.8 
UK 
5.5 
11.0 
11.0 
10.8 
1.5 
1.0 
3.2 
2.5 
Italy 
1.4 
2.0 
1.8 
4.3 
2.5 
5.0 
1.0 
3.4 
Switzerland 
4.0 
7.0 
4.7 
4.8 
0.7 
2.1 
1.0 
1.3 
Source: OECD financial statistics, various issues. 
Note: Margin = T-bill rate minus deposit rate for all countries, except Switzerland 
where the bond rate is used. The interest margin on demand deposits applies to 
non-interest bearing deposits in all countries, Belgium and Italy excepted. 
Empirical evidence on this topic is scarce in Europe. We report two 
sources of evidence that lend support to the effectiveness hypothesis. 
In a detailed analysis of the operating costs of Belgian banks, De Grauwe 
and Pacolet (1983) estimate the costs of demand deposits as between 
2 and 6%, well below the interest margin on demand deposits in Belgium 
over the last twenty years. Table 6 presents evidence for other countries. 
A second type of evidence is provided by Dermine and Langohr (1986) 
in an analysis of the banking sector in France. Following the recent 
application of Tobin's q approach to industrial organization (Linden-
berg-Ross, 1981), they seek to explain the determinants of the stock 
market value of 60 French banks listed on the stock exchange. They 
report a positive correlation between market value and the volume of 
demand deposits on which a zero interest rate regulation applies. 
Although evidence on imperfect competition in European countries is 
far from complete, we will assume that controls on interest rates are to 
some extent effective and proceed with the analysis of the prudential, 
macroeconomic and welfare arguments. 
4.2. Deposit rate regulation as a a prudential device 
A common argument for the regulation of deposit rates is that excessive 
competition will create overbanking, a high cost of funds and incentives 
for banks to take excessive risks. This argument appears to have very 
weak theoretical and empirical foundations. A well-established model 
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Marginal 
cost of 
deposits 
Market rate 
L* D* 
Figure 1. The Klein-Monti model 
of the banking firm (Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972) establishes that a profit-
maximizing bank operating in a well-developed financial market will 
equalize the marginal cost of deposits and the marginal return on loans 
to an exogenous market rate such as the Treasury Bill or the interbank 
rate. Figure 1 illustrates the basic ideas of the Klein-Monti model. The 
return on the interbank market or the Treasury Bill rate (the market 
rate) is assumed to be given to the individual bank while the increasing 
marginal cost of funds and the decreasing return on loans are caused 
by imperfect competition or by increasing marginal cost. The optimal 
level of loans and deposits are given by L* and D* where the marginal 
return and cost intersect the exogenous market rate, the peg of the 
system. The main result of this model is that the lending side is com-
pletely independent of the deposit side. Control of deposit rates will 
not affect the pricing of loans since banks take the market rate as the 
opportunity cost of granting loans.11 Of course, one can argue that 
regulation of deposit rates will affect savings so that the market rate is 
endogenous. However, as the effect of deposit rate regulation on savings 
is empirically unclear, it is difficult to assess this macroeconomic effect 
on risk taking by banks. 
1
' Baltensperger (1980) argues that the existence of joint operating costs will create a link between 
deposits and loans but it is unclear how a regulation on deposit rates will affect lending in this 
context. 
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Recent developments of this model (Dermine 1984, 1986) include 
the risk of bankruptcy and the existence of a deposit insurance system 
with flat-rate premiums. In this more complex version, the relationship 
between deposit and lending rates becomes recursive. The deposit side 
is independent - that is, the deposit rate is solely a function of the 
interbank rate - but the lending side depends now on the interbank 
rate, on equity and on the profit margin on deposits. The higher the 
level of equity or of the profit margin on deposits, the less it pays to 
finance risky loans: this is so because a bank should disregard, in its 
analysis of risky assets, the states of the world when it would be bankrupt 
since its liability is limited. Of course, with a higher level of equity or 
a larger profit margin on deposits, the risk of bankruptcy is reduced, 
and the bank, therefore, attaches a higher weight to the possible losses 
on its loan portfolio. Consequently, effective regulation of deposit rates 
which increases the margin on deposits will reduce the incentive for 
risk taking. But the same result can be achieved by increasing equity. 
It is not clear why this prudential cushion should be paid by depositors 
rather than by shareholders. Moreover, it can be shown that the pruden-
tial incentives that have been described would not even exist if deposit 
insurance premia were related to the risk taken by the banks. In this 
case, the lending side is independent of deposits as the bank will have 
to care about its potential losses in bankruptcy states since the insurance 
premiums will be related to these losses. 
The theoretical rationale for deposit rate control on prudential 
grounds appears very weak since an increase in equity can achieve the 
same result with no distortion on the deposit market. Empirical studies 
conducted by Benston (1964) and Smirlock (1984) do not find evidence 
of any link between competition on deposits and risk taking by banks. 
Even so, deregulation of deposit rates may still increase the likelihood 
of financial instability. It is very likely that some banks which have 
subsidized loss-making activities with their cheap source of funds will 
be forced to default. The regulators will have to close these banks in 
time as financial history shows how tempting it is for bankers to gamble 
and recoup their losses once they are on the verge of insolvency. 
4.3. Deposit rates and the cost of bank loans 
In defence of deposit rate controls, it is often asserted that a lower cost 
of funds will be passed on to borrowers through lower loan rates, with 
a positive effect on investment and growth. To ensure clarity, it is 
essential to distinguish a standard microeconomic argument from an 
often bypassed macroeconomic one. 
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The microeconomic discussion of the previous section was concerned 
with the regulation of profit-maximizing banks, but there exist many 
public or 'cooperative' intermediaries in Europe for which profit 
maximization may not be the first objective. These firms could, in 
principle, pass on their deposit margins to the borrowers. However, 
assuming that an investment subsidy is desirable, the real question, 
from a public finance point of view, becomes the choice of financing 
for this subsidy. A control on the deposit rate is similar to a tax on 
deposits and the welfare cost arises from a distortion in the allocation 
of resources as well as from a change in the distribution of income. On 
the resource allocation aspect, it is not evident why a tax on depositors 
would be optimal, and on distributional grounds, it is certainly a regress-
ive tax as wealthier depositors will have access to market rate instru-
ments. This last effect can be reduced if the interest income on iow 
yield' deposits is tax free (as in the case of France). 
The loan subsidy argument could prove to be a fallacy as the 
macroeconomic impact on growth and investment remains to be 
clarified. As has been pointed out by Tobin (1970) or van Wijnbergen 
(1983), the total supply of risk-bearing funds will depend both on the 
interest rate elasticity of savings and on the substitution properties of 
the various supplies of assets. In particular, it matters a great deal 
whether higher deposit rates attract savings out of currency or out of 
risk-bearing assets. The effect on the market risk premium will be 
negative if savings are attracted out of currency while it could be positive 
if savings come out of risk-bearing assets. We know of no empirical 
studies establishing a macroeconomic case for deposit rate regulation. 
4.4. Deposit rate regulation and fixed rate lending 
The third argument asserts that borrowers prefer fixed-rate loans to 
floating-rate ones. In Belgium for instance there is still fierce opposition 
from consumer groups to a floating-rate mortgage proposal (Com-
mission Bancaire, 1985). This argument is well grounded in economic 
theory which shows that risk-averse borrowers prefer fixed-rate loans 
to stabilize their income (Fried-Howitt, 1980 and Okun, 1984), and 
that a risk-neutral bank would lend to risk-averse borrowers on a 
fixed-rate basis. But even a risk-averse bank could lend on a fixed-
rate basis if depositors also prefer a stable income on their deposits. 
On this interpretation, deposit rate control is interpreted as a way to 
enforce a risk-sharing contract between banks, depositors and bor-
rowers. Indeed, under asymmetric information, it may be difficult to 
lock a net saver into low-yield deposits. While this argument may appear 
reasonable in a low-inflation world (like the one of the 1960s), its validity 
90 Ernst Baltensperger and Jean Dermine 
can be questioned once the level of inflation becomes uncertain. Bor-
rowers and depositors will be concerned about the stability of their real 
income and index-linked mortgages will be demanded by risk-averse 
borrowers if there are reasonable covariances between inflation, 
nominal wages and the value of their houses (Statman, 1982) or if the 
heavy liquidity constraint imposed by the nominal interest rate (the tilt 
problem) is avoided through indexed loans (Aim and Follain, 1984). 
The example of Finland in the 1950s and 1960s is worth considering. 
Finland moved to an indexed financial system up to 1967 (Kouri, 1985). 
A remarkable fact is that there was a large demand for indexed assets, 
also inflation was moderate (average rate of 4.74% over the period 
1954-67). By the end of 1967, 77% of loans had an index clause and 
35% of deposits were indexed. 
In any case, the risk argument in favour of deposit rate regulation 
is weakened by the existence of financial futures markets and of modern 
hedging techniques which permit the supply of long-term fixed-rate 
assets financed by floating-rate deposits. Interest rate risk for individual 
banks is no longer related to the maturity mismatching of the balance 
sheet, as the risk can be fully hedged off-balance-sheet with new contin-
gent contracts such as futures, options and swaps. 
A final concern is the practice of concerted pricing which is common 
in many European countries (for instance Belgium, France, the Nether-
lands and Switzerland). In contrast to government regulation, concerted 
pricing offers the benefit of flexibility and responsiveness to market 
conditions which will prevent disintermediation, but it also raises the 
spectre of wide margins and abnormal returns. Anti-cartel controls 
could be enacted to prevent the emergence of abnormal rents, but one 
runs immediately into the problem of measuring this margin. Concerted 
pricing should be abolished and, since the fear of predatory pricing is 
often raised, one could rely on anti-dumping regulations. Here, one 
should distinguish marketing policies aimed at launching a new product 
(the observed negative margins on the newly authorized Money Market 
Deposit Accounts in the US) from dumping policies aimed at establish-
ing a monopoly position. 
In conclusion, our analysis of the prudential, macroeconomic and 
welfare arguments shows that there is little rationale for the regulation 
of deposit rates. The link between the interest rates on loans and deposits 
is very weak for the profit-maximizing firm and the tax-subsidy 
approach needs to be justified both because deposit rate regulation is 
a regressive tax and because the macroeconomic benefits are highly 
uncertain. The only convincing argument is that effective regulation 
creates a rent which arts as a substitute for equity but, if stricter capital 
ratios can be imposed, then the case for a complete deregulation of 
deposit rates in Europe is very strong indeed. 
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5. The international aspects 
In the European context - especially in view of the efforts of the 
European Commission to create a common banking market - one has 
to extend the analysis to the international regulation of banks. Two 
views seem to be emerging on the appropriate design of international 
bank regulation. The first advocates that 'the principle of national 
treatment should be universally accepted as governing trade in financial 
services' (Walter, 1985, p. 117). All banks, domestic or foreign, operating 
in a particular country should obey the same regulatory prudential 
rules imposed by the national supervisor. This principle should fully 
provide for fair competition while accepting the sovereign prerogative 
on prudential and monetary policy matters. The second view argues 
for the 'home country' principle, whereby the control of the 'parent' 
bank should apply to the entire worldwide consolidated bank, branches 
and subsidaries included. This is the view held by the European Com-
mission (Clarotti, 1984). In this section, we discuss the validity of these 
two principles, first reviewing the evolution of bank integration in the 
European Economic Community, then analysing the international 
aspects of regulation. 
5.1. Banking in the EEC 
The primary objective of the 1957 Treaty of Rome was the transforma-
tion of highly protected national markets into a common market. To 
this end, Articles 52 to 66 provide for the freedom of establishment 
and freedom to provide services, while Article 57 refers to the coordina-
tion of national legislation. This coordination may precede, coincide 
with or follow the abolition of restrictions. It has to be decided by the 
Council of Ministers, on a proposal by the Commission, at the same 
time as the directives relating to a particular sector are drawn up 
(directives, which are not laws, place an obligation on Member States 
to bring their own practices, and therefore laws, into line with the 
directives). 
In June 1973 the Council adopted a directive on 'the abolition of 
restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide ser-
vices in respect of self-employed activities of banks and other financial 
institutions'. As Clarotti notes, 'The application of the rules of the 
Treaty in the field of establishment is a reassuring one, in that very 
little discrimination remains in the Member States' (Clarotti, 1984, p. 
201). However, this reassuring view should not give the impression of 
a common banking market, as the supply of cross-border services is 
seriously limited by controls on capital movements in many member 
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countries (France, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal). Unless 
such controls are repealed, there can be no truly integrated banking 
market. 
In December 1977, the Council adopted a 'First directive on the 
coordination of laws, regulation and administrative provisions relating 
to the taking up and pursuit of credit institutions'. In particular, the 
directive establishes the principle of home country control, according 
to which the supervision of credit institutions operating in several Mem-
ber States will gradually be shifted from the host country to the home 
country. The 1977 directive is a first step toward the harmonization of 
regulations. It is a general programme which, without providing any 
precise regulatory rules, calls for further directives. Following this very 
pragmatic effort to harmonize regulations and integrate markets, the 
Council adopted in December 1983 a directive on the supervision of 
credit institutions on a consolidated basis. Another directive on a uni-
form format for annual accounts is under discussion and a Banking 
Advisory Committee has been set up to work on the harmonization of 
prudential solvency and liquidity ratios. This effort raises several issues, 
inter alia the respective responsibilities of the various national super-
visors. Finally, the Commission launched a major new initiative in June 
1985, with the aim of completely unifying the EEC's internal market 
by 1992. 
5.2. The regulation of international banks 
Two main issues arise in the context of international banking. The first 
concerns the extent of responsibility of the domestic lender of last resort 
and of deposit insurance systems. Do they cover branches and sub-
sidiaries of domestic banks operating abroad? Do they cover branches 
and subsidiaries of foreign banks operating domestically? 
The second issue concerns supervision and regulation. Does domestic 
regulation apply to all banks operating in the country (the national 
treatment principle)? Does it apply to the foreign component of domes-
tic banks operating abroad (the home country principle)? The theoreti-
cal arguments on the origin of bank regulation allows us to organize 
the responsibilities. Since regulation is motivated by the moral hazard 
argument (the opportunities available to banks to exploit the lender of 
last resort or deposit insurance policies), one is led to conclude that 
supervision and control should be exercised by the responsible lender 
of last resort or deposit insurance agency. The principle of correspon-
dence between supervision and effective insurance has been raised 
several times in the literature on the international lender of last resort 
(e.g. Guttentag and Herring, 1983; Dale, 1984) but, quite surprisingly, 
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the recent creation of national deposit insurance systems has not yet 
received much attention. 
Current deposit insurance systems (e.g. in the UK, Belgium and 
Netherlands) cover the deposits of domestic and foreign banks operat-
ing domestically, but not those of domestic banks operating abroad. 
The various national deposit insurance systems are concerned with the 
risks taken by the insured banks and their supervision extends to all 
banks operating domestically. This legal framework of insurance on a 
domestic basis calls for regulation on a domestic basis and the national 
treatment principle should apply. However, the de facto responsibilities 
of deposit insurance are more complex and we believe that there is a 
good case for joint supervision by host and home country supervisors. 
Indeed, in many cases the parent bank is likely to be pressed to intervene 
(legal commitments in the case of branches, moral pressures coming 
from letters of comfort or from the home authorities, or simply self-
interest if the credit of the parent bank is affected). The parent bank 
will often be involved in the crisis of its foreign affiliate and the deposit 
insurer of the parent bank will rightly want to control the bank on a 
consolidated basis (the home country principle). Domestic regulation 
is justified by the domestic organization of deposit insurance while 
home country control is called for by the likely responsibility of the 
parent bank. 
The current form of implicit insurance provided by the lender of 
last resort leads to similar conclusions. The discretionary nature of 
lender-of-last-resort aid and fears that nationalistic attitudes will prevail 
in case of crisis make it difficult to allocate the full responsibility to the 
lender of last resort of the parent bank. A shared responsibility between 
the host and the parent lender of last resort will emerge and, on this 
basis, supervision should also be shared. Both the European Commission 
and the BIS Committee on Bank Regulation and Supervisory Practices 
(Concordat II, May 1983) call for supervision on a consolidated basis, 
but they seem to differ in interpretation. The BIS Concordat accepts 
dual regulation by the host and parent authorities while the European 
Commission wants to transfer control to the supervisor of the parent 
bank. Under the current system of shared insurance responsibilities, it 
seems that the BIS recommendation should prevail. 
A possible structural change would be to require deposit insurance 
on a consolidated basis. The deposit insurer of the parent bank would 
cover the depositors' losses in subsidiaries or branches abroad. There 
are three difficulties, however, implied by the associated shift to home 
country control and consolidated supervision. First, information on a 
foreign banking system may be more difficult to obtain and interpret. 
Second, a possible shortage of foreign currency reserves can make the 
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deposit insurance of a foreign-currency deposits more hazardous (since 
the lender of last resort would not be able to print money). Guttentag 
and Herring (1983) report a tiering among Eurobanks chartered in 
countries having a balance-of-payments difficulties. Third, and probably 
more important, are the pressures of peer banks to reduce risk taking 
under an apportionment deposit insurance system. When losses are 
shared among the banks (the 'banking club' mentioned earlier), press-
ures by peer banks will attempt to limit the risks taken by domestic 
banks, but, because of imperfect information, the pressures on activities 
abroad are likely to be less stringent. This last argument has been used 
by the European Federation of Banks to oppose a consolidated insur-
ance proposal by the Commission. Unless financial markets are more 
integrated, information more readily available and pressures of peer 
banks stronger on foreign operations, it seems wiser to limit the 
responsibilities of the various deposit insurance systems to their domestic 
markets. This implies that host countries should maintain the super-
vision on all banks operating domestically. 
6. Conclusions 
Deregulation and financial integration are creating very competitive 
financial markets. What ten years ago used to be the protected business 
of banks - commercial and personal loans, deposits and the management 
of the payment system - is gradually being competed away by new 
entrants such as savings banks, investment banks or finance subsidiaries 
of industrial and retail firms. Moreover, the risks involved in economic 
activity are being shared directly by many parties or through the use 
of sophisticated new financial instruments such as options and financial 
futures. The transfer of funds from surplus to deficit units is possible 
with lower transaction costs and risks are shared efficiently. But if the 
risks are being shared, they do not disappear and some accidents are 
bound to occur. Appropriate private or public mechanisms have yet to 
be put in place to reduce the risk of a s. stemic crisis and to protect the 
interests of various parties. As the banking industry is characterized by 
the financing of illiquid assets with short-term deposits, the fear of bank 
runs creates the need for public intervention. We recommend greater 
regulation of the deposit contract, while increasing incentives for bank 
monitoring by private parties. Three proposals have been discussed. 
Private deposit insurance with flexible premia would be a step in the 
right direction but public regulation wiil remain necessary as insurance 
companies could go bankrupt. Deposit insurance is no longer needed 
in the second proposal of an ex post p nalty because it is imposed on 
all current and former depositors. Th? i sk of a run is reduced since 
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there is no way to avoid the penalty and monitoring incentives are 
substantially increased. Technical aspects, such as the timing of bank 
failure and the enforcement of the ex post penalty, have to be solved 
but they do not seem more complex than the computation of a flexible 
risk-related insurance premium. The third proposal, corporate separ-
ateness, would complement the first two by separating the activities of 
banks that could not be monitored or diversified. Finally, since market 
failure is related to imperfect information and moral hazard, we suggest 
an increase in the disclosure of information by banks and a rise in the 
equity ratio. This last recommendation would not only increase the 
soundness of the banking system but also reduce the incentives for 
excessive risk taking. 
Concerning the regulation of deposit rates which still prevails in 
several countries, we do not find any theoretical or empirical argument 
to support it and we recommend the abolition of controls or cartel-like 
agreements on deposit rates. Finally, in an international context, we 
observe that lender-of-last-resort activities and deposit insurance are 
conducted chiefly at the national level, and we recommend a joint 
supervision of the international bank by the host and parent authorities. 
Discussion 
Charles Goodhart 
London School of Economics 
Analysis of the role and functions of banking has become a lively and 
exciting field in recent years, since many of the features of markets 
that interest theorists, such as informational asymmetries, performance 
monitoring problems, and bankruptcy costs, are crucial elements here. 
Accordingly, the study of banking has ceased to be primarily a preserve 
of institutionalists. 
There are several strands among these theoretical developments. 
One, which the authors capture fully, is the capacity in which 'Banks 
act as insurance companies', in order to provide alternative forms of 
such insurance in cases where 'A standard insurance market will not 
emerge because the information about liquidity needs is pr ivate. . . ' . 
The differences between the preferred habitats of savers, who want 
liquifiable assets, and borrowers who want to borrow on illiquifiable 
terms, can be regarded as leading each of them to want to deal in 
primary securities (the transfer of the funds from ultimate saver to 
ultimate borrower), while at the same time wanting to take out an 
insurance contract against the risk of being caught short. That insurance 
contract cannot, however, be provided in the open market, since the 
